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ARTICLE 
THE MARYLAND PERSONAL INFORMATION 
PROTECTION ACT: STRENGTHENING MARYLAND'S 
SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION LAW 
By: Michael Greenberger* and Mathew Swinburne** 
1. INTRODUCTION 
"[W]e are vulnerable to people who would use our identities against us."J 
It has been reported that in 2010,8.1 million Americans were victims 
of identity theft.2 The U.S. Government Accountability Office generally 
defines identity theft as "'stealing' another person's personal identifying 
information-such as Social Security number (SSN), date of birth, and 
mother's maiden name-and then using the information to fraudulently 
establish credit, run up debt, or take over existing financial accounts.,,3 
However, this definition fails to capture the full spectrum of threats 
presented by identity theft. Such stolen information can also be exploited 
to commit phone or utilities fraud, commit government documents fraud, 
fraudulently rent a home, or fraudulently obtain employment under the 
stolen identity.4 Identity theft has a substantial financial impact. In 2010, 
the total cost of this fraud in the United States was an estimated $37 
billion, while the average out of pocket cost for the identity theft victim 
* Michael Greenberger, J.D., is the Founder and Director of the Center for Health and 
Homeland Security, at the University of Maryland, Baltimore as well as a professor at the 
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. 
** Mathew Swinburne, J.D., is a Law and Policy Analyst at the Center for Health and 
Homeland Security. 
I Kevin Rademacher, Clarke: ID Theft Prevention Tied to Anti-terrorism Efforts, LAS 
VEGAS SUN, Apr. 13, 2005, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com!news/2005/apr/13/ 
clarke-id-theft-prevention-tied-to-anti-terrorism-I (quoting Richard Clarke, former 
counterterrorism czar for Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton). 
2 JAVELIN STRATEGY AND RESEARCH, 2011 IDENTITY FRAUD SURVEY REpORT 1 (Feb. 8, 
20 11), available at http://www.idsafety.net/201IIDFraudReportRelease.pdf. 
3 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-424T, IDENTITY THEFT: AVAILABLE 
DATA INDICATE GROWTH IN PREVALENCE AND COST I (Feb. 14, 2002), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02424t.pdf. 
4 About Identity Theft, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: FIGHTING BACK AGAINST IDENTITY 
THEFT, available at http://www.ftc.govlbcp/edulmicrosites/idtheftlconsumers/about-identity-
theft.html (listing potential threats resulting from identity theft) (last visited Apr. 8, 2012). 
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was $631.5 It is important to note that during this time period, Maryland 
ranked ninth in per capita identity theft complaints. 6 
In a post-9fll world, identity theft also has serious homeland security 
implications. In 2003, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Assistant 
Director ofthe Counter Terrorism Division, addressed this issue: 
Today, the threat is made graver by the fact that terrorists can 
utilize identity theft as well as Social Security Number fraud to 
enable them to obtain such things as cover employment and 
access to secure locations. These and similar means can be 
utilized by terrorists to obtain Driver's Licenses, and bank and 
credit card accounts through which terrorism financing is 
facilitated. Terrorists and terrorist groups require funding to 
perpetrate their terrorist agendas. The methods used to finance 
terrorism range from the highly sophisticated to the most basic. 
There is virtually no financing method that has not at some level 
been exploited by these groups. Identity theft is a key catalyst 
fueling many of these methods. 7 
These concerns are not speculative-they are reality. In 2002, an Al 
Qaeda terrorist cell in Spain utilized stolen credit card information to 
make numerous purchases. 8 Terrorists in Great Britain amassed over 
$3.5 million in fraudulent charges, using stolen credit card information, to 
purchase equipment, prepaid cell phones, and airline tickets for jihadi 
field operations.9 It is also believed that Imam Samudra, convicted 
terrorist and the engineer of the 2002 bombing of a Bali nightclub, tried 
to fund the attack utilizing stolen credit card information. 1o In Samudra's 
jailhouse biography he calls on jihadists "to take the holy war into 
cyberspace by attacking the U.S. computers, with the particular aim of 
5 JAVELIN STRATEGY AND RESEARCH, supra note 2, at 1,2. 
6 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK FOR 
JANUARy-DECEMBER 2011, 14 (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.fic.gov/sentinellreports/ 
sentinel-annual-reports/sentinel-cy20 1 O. pdf. 
7 Fraudulent Identification Documents and the Implication for Homeland Security: 
Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. On Homeland Sec., lOSth Congo (Oct. 1, 2003) 
(testimony of John S. Pistole, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau 
of Investigation), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/fraudulent-identification-
documents-and-the-implications-for-homeland-security. 
8 U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-705, CYBERCRIME: PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE ENTITIES FACE CHALLENGES IN ADDRESSING CYBER THREATS 22 (June 2007), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07705.pdf. 
9 Kimberly Kiefer Peretti, Data Breaches: What the Underground World of "Carding" 
Reveals, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 375,393-95 (2009) (discussing how 
terrorists use stolen identities and credit card information). 
10 Id. at 394. 
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committing credit card fraud." 1 1 In addition to financing terrorist 
operations, identity theft is utilized to generate false documents such as 
birth certificates, licenses, social security cards, and passports. 12 The 
9/11 Commission Report highlights the danger of these false documents 
when it states, "[f]or terrorists, travel documents are as important as 
weapons."J3 
One way to help prevent identity theft is to require businesses that 
own, license, or maintain personal information to notify individuals when 
their data systems have been breached, exposing this sensitive personal 
information. Data breaches can result from improper handling or 
disposal of paper records, stolen or lost data storage devices, hacking of 
databases, employee theft, or improper handling of electronic data. 14 
These breaches present a considerable risk. Since the beginning of 2005, 
over 540,000,000 records containing private personal information have 
been compromised as the result of data breaches in the United States. 15 
In addition to exposing sensitive personal information, these incidents 
result in considerable financial burdens for the companies subject to the 
breach. One benchmark study estimates that in 2010 the average large 
data breach (between 1,000-100,000 compromised records) cost 
approximately $7.2 million. 16 
By requiring notification, businesses are provided with an incentive to 
improve their data security in order to avoid reputational damage, and 
individuals are given a chance to take protective actions. States have 
taken a leading role in establishing broad-spectrum security breach 
notification laws ("SBNL"). California enacted the first SBNL in 2003 17 
and now 45 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin 
11 Alan Sipress, An Indonesian's Prison Memoir Takes Holy War Into Cyberspace, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlac2/wp-
dyn/A62095-2004Dec13. 
12 See Kristin M. Finklea, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., R40599, IDENTITY THEFT: TRENDS 
AND ISSUES 19 (Jan. 5, 2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/miscIR40599.pdf 
(discussing terrorist utilizing identity theft to generate fraudulent documents). 
13 NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REpORT, 384 (2004), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdfi'sec12.pdf. 
14 See Data Breaches: A Year in Review, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARING HOUSE (Dec. 16, 
2011), http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach-year-review-2011. 
15 See Security Breaches 2005--Present, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARING HOUSE, 
https:llwww.privacyrights.org/data-breach (last updated Apr. 6, 2012) (maintaining a running 
count of reported information security breaches). 
16 PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2010 ANNuAL STUDY: U.S. COST OF A DATA BREACH, 11, 13 
(Mar. 2011), available at http://www.symantec.comlcontentlenlus/aboutlmedialpdfs/ 
symantec -ponemon _data_breach _costs _report.pdf. 
17 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, .82 (West 2011). 
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Islands have followed suit. 18 Alabama, Kentucky, New Mexico, and 
South Dakota are the four states that do not have security breach 
notification laws. 19 Maryland enacted its security breach notification 
legislation in 2007 with the passage of the Maryland Personal 
Information Protection Act ("MPIP A"). 20 
While the MPIP A provides important safeguards, the Act can be 
strengthened to better secure Marylanders' personal information. This 
article evaluates the effectiveness of MPIP A and presents solutions to 
address identified gaps. The analysis of this piece focuses on the 
following key components of MPIP A: (1) the type of infonnation 
protected by the act; (2) the parties subject to MPIPA's requirements; (3) 
breach notification triggers and timelines; (4) preemptive security 
measures; and (5) select civil enforcement provisions. The modifications 
presented in this analysis will increase the legislations effectiveness by: 
(1) closing loopholes to increase the legislation's applicability; (2) 
addressing ambiguous provisions; (3) increasing the legislation's ability 
to prevent information security breaches in the first place; and (4) 
creating incentives to help ensure that each business's risk analysis favors 
compliance with Maryland's legislation. These suggested improvements 
would better secure the personal infonnation of Marylanders and, as a 
result, mitigate the financial and security threats posed by identity theft. 
II. INFORMATION PROTECTED BY THE MARYLAND PERSONAL 
INFORMATION PROTECTION ACT 
In analyzing the Maryland Personal Infonnation Protection Act 
("MPIP A"), the first element of the legislation that must be explored is 
the type of information the Maryland government has chosen to protect. 
Unfortunately, the current legislation is underinclusive because it 
narrowly defines personal information and it has a bias for electronic 
data. 
A. Defining Personal Information 
The core of all state security breach notification laws ("SBNL") is the 
definition of "personal information." As discussed earlier, SBNLs 
18 See Security Breach Legislation 2011, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.orgldefault.aspx?tabid=22295 (last updated Dec. 21, 2011); see also DATA 
QUALITY CAMPAIGN, STATE SECURITY BREACH RESPONSE LAWS: STATE-BY-STATE SUMMARY 
TABLE, available at 
http://www.dataqualitycampaign.org:8080/files/State%20Security''1020Breach%20Chart%20Fi 
nal%20for%20posting%202020 II %2003%201 O.pdf (last updated Feb. 2011). 
19 STATE SECURITY BREACH RESPONSE LAWS: STATE-BY-STATE SUMMARY TABLE, supra 
note 18, at 1, 7, 13, 17. 
20 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 14-3501 to -3508 (West 2011). 
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protect individuals' personal information in an attempt to prevent its use 
in the perpetration of identity theft. In Maryland, there are three basic 
protections provided under MPIP A: (1) protection of personal 
information during the disposal of records21 ; (2) adoption of reasonable 
security procedures and practices to prevent unauthorized access to 
personal information22 ; and (3) individual notification when a business 
has experienced a breach of security that resulted in or will likely result in 
the misuse of an individual's personal information.23 MPIPA defines 
personal information as: 
an individual's first name or first initial and last name in 
combination with anyone or more of the following data elements, 
when the name or data elements are not encrypted, redacted, or 
otherwise protected by another method that renders the 
information unreadable or unusable: (i) A Social Security 
Number; (ii) A driver's license number; (iii) A Financial account 
number, including a credit card or debit card number, that in 
combination with any required security code, access code, or 
password, would permit access to an individual's financial 
information account; or (iv) An Individuals Taxpayer 
Identification Number.24 
In addition to the exclusion of information that is rendered unreadable or 
unusable, MPIP A also excludes the following from its definition of 
personal information: 
(i) Publicly available information that is lawfully made available 
to the general public from federal, State, or local government 
records; (ii) Information that an individual has consented to have 
publicly disseminated or listed; or (iii) Information that is 
disseminated or listed in accordance with the federal Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. 25 
It is important to note that this definition requires two separate 
components to qualify as personal information: the individual's name and 
one of the enumerated data elements.26 
There are two problems with this definition of personal information. 
First, the definition fails to capture the full spectrum of data that could be 
utilized to perpetrate identity theft. For example, some secured websites 
21 COM. LAW § 14-3502. 
22 COM. LAW § 14-3503. 
23 COM. LAW § 14-3504. 
24 COM. LAW § 14-3501(d)(1). 
25 COM. LAW § 14-3501(d)(2). 
26 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3501(d)(l) (West 2011). 
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have password retrieval functions that require an individual's email 
address and the answer to a personal security question, such as the 
individual's mother's maiden name or the name of a pet.27 The 
combination of such information can be used to gain access to an 
individual's account and expose additional information that can be used 
to perpetrate identity theft.28 Another example of a gap in MPIP A is the 
failure to capture biometric and genetic data within the definition of 
personal information. While not currently in wide use, these types of data 
have the potential to be exploited for identity theft as technology 
develops. 29 Further, the uniquely personal nature of this data presents a 
heightened vulnerability because "[ w ]hile individuals can always obtain a 
new Social Security number, they cannot be issued new fingerprints, 
DNA, retinas, or faces.,,3o 
The second issue with MPIP A's definition of personal information is 
that its two-pronged approach, requiring the individual's name and an 
additional data element, limits its effectiveness. For example, if a 
business experienced an information security breach that exposed an 
individual's social security number, driver's license number, mother's 
maiden name, and street address, it would not qualify for the protections 
of MPIPA because the breach did not expose the individual's name. 
Such a distinction seems like a dangerous line to draw. 
Other states have recognized the need for a more inclusive definition 
of personal information, and there are several approaches to achieving 
this goal. Some states apply the same two-component approach used by 
Maryland, requiring the individual's name and an additional data 
element.3! However, they adopt a more expansive list of qualifying data 
elements. For example, North Carolina recognizes email addresses, 
electronic signatures, fingerprints, biometric data, and a parent's legal 
surname prior to marriage.32 North Dakota has expanded its definition to 
include an individual's date of birth, mother's maiden name, and an 
27 See Jacqueline May Tom, A Simple Compromise: The Need for a Federal Data Breach 
Notification Law, 84 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1569, 1598 (Fall 2010) (utilizing this example when 
discussing the need for a flexible definition of personal information in security breach 
notification legislation). 
28 /d. 
29 Brendad St. Amant, Recent Development, The Misplaced Role of Identity Theft in 
Triggering Public Notice of Database Breaches, 44 HARV. 1. ON LEGIS. 505, 525-26 (2007) 
(discussing the current and potential uses of biometric data and the need to include this 
information in security breach notification laws). 
30 Id. at 526. 
31 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 899-aa(1)(b) (West 2011). 
32 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §75-61(lO) (West 2011) (defining personal information as a 
person's first name or first initial and last name in combination with identifying information as 
defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §14-113.20(b) (West 2011». 
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identification number assigned to the individual by his or her employer. 33 
Others have included medical and healthcare information in their 
definition of protected information.34 Wisconsin has taken a progressive 
approach and included an individual's DNA profile.35 
Alternatively, New York defines personal information as "any 
information concerning a natural person which, because of name, 
number, personal mark or other identifier, can be used to identify such 
natural person.,,36 However, New York limits the scope of this expansive 
definition by only requiring breach notification when it pertains to 
"private information. ,,37 New York defines "private information" as 
personal information in combination with any of the following data 
elements: "(1) social security number; (2) driver's license or non-driver 
license identification card number; or (3) account number, credit or debit 
card number, in combination with any required security code, access code 
or password that would permit access to an individual's financial 
account.,,38 New York's system is similar to Maryland's two-pronged 
definition, except the name requirement has been replaced by a more 
expansive individual identifier. 
Oregon has expanded its definition of personal information not by 
adding data elements, but by removing requirements. Its SBNL does not 
require that the breached data include the individual's first name or first 
initial and last name. 39 It only requires that data elements acquired in the 
security breach are sufficient to permit a person to commit identity 
theft.4o However, Oregon limits the qualifying data elements to the 
following: 
(A) Social Security number; (B) Driver license number or state 
identification card number issued by the Department of 
Transportation; (C) Passport number or other United States issued 
identification number; or (D) Financial account number, credit or 
debit card number, in combination with any required security 
code, access code or password that would permit access to a 
consumer's financial account.41 
33 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 5 1-30-01 (2)(West 2011). 
34 See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.002(a)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2011); see also 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-llO-103(7)(D) (West 2011). 
35 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.98(1)(b)(4) (West 2011). 
36 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 899-aa(l)(a) (West 2011). 
37 See GEN. Bus. § 899-aa(2)-(3). 
38 GEN. Bus. § 899-aa(l)(b). 
39 OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 646A.602(l1)(b) (West 2011). 
40 Id. 
41 See § 646A.602(ll)(a); see also §646A.602 (ll)(b) (stating .that the combination of 
elements must be composed of elements listed in (a)). 
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To ensure that MPIPA is effective in protecting Marylanders from 
identity theft, the definition of personal information has to be broadened 
to capture additional sensitive information. At the same time, the 
definition needs flexibility to adapt to the arrival of new types of 
information and technology that can expose individuals to identity theft. 
Such flexibility must also account for information combinations outside 
of the traditional name and additional data element format. To 
accomplish these goals, Maryland should adopt New York's personal 
information definition: "any information concerning a natural person 
which, because of name, number, personal mark or other identifier, can 
be used to identify such natural person.,,42 However, it should not be 
limited by requiring private information data elements to trigger the 
statutes protections. Instead, Maryland should adopt a non-exclusive list 
of data elements that qualify as per se personal information. The list of 
data elements should build upon what Maryland has already enumerated, 
while adding critical information such as electronic signatures, biometric 
data, and a parent's legal surname prior to marriage. The expansiveness 
of this definition would be sufficiently limited by two provisions. First, 
MPIP A currently excludes the following from its definition of personal 
information: 
(i) Publicly available information that is lawfully made available 
to the general public from federal, State, or local government 
records; (ii) Information that an individual has consented to have 
publicly disseminated or listed; or (iii) Information that is 
disseminated or listed in accordance with the federal Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability ACt.43 
The second relevant provision is the proposed notification trigger, 
discussed in Section III, Subsection A of this article, which would limit 
notification to instances where there is a reasonable threat of Identity 
Fraud.44 While additional information would be protected under this 
definition of personal information, this proposed trigger would reduce the 
need to provide notice to instances where there is a threat of a specific 
harm. Overall the above-proposed definition of personal information 
ensures greater inclusion of sensitive data and allows the statute to remain 
effective as technology and data use progress.45 
42 GEN. Bus. § 899-aa (1)(a). 
43 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3501 (d)(2) (West 2011). 
44 Tom, supra note 27, at 1579-80. 
45 See Tom, supra note 27, at 1588-89 (suggesting a similar approach for defining 
personal information for federal security breach notification legislation). 
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B. A Bias for Computerized Data 
The second issue with Maryland's current treatment of personal 
information is that it varies depending on the medium on which it is 
stored. Computerized personal information is provided a greater level of 
protection than hard copies of the same information. This discrepancy 
can be seen by analyzing the three basic protections provided by MPIP A. 
The first, the protection of personal information during the disposal of 
records, is provided to all personal information regardless of its storage 
media. MPIP A states that 
[w]hen a business is destroying a customer's records that contain 
personal information of the customer, the business shall take 
reasonable steps to protect against unauthorized access to or use 
of the personal information, taking into account (1) The 
sensitivity of the records; (2) The nature and size of the business 
and its operations; (3) The costs and benefits of different 
destruction methods; and (4) Available technology. 46 
This protection is applicable to paper records and other non-computerized 
media because MPIP A defines "records" as "information that is inscribed 
on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium 
and is retrievable in perceivable form.,,47 The second protection, the need 
to establish reasonable security procedures and practices as required 
under section 14-3503 of the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland 
Code, also applies to all personal information.48 
Alternatively, the third protection, which requires businesses to notify 
individuals when their personal information has been exposed as the 
result of a security breach, only applies to computerized data. A 
"[b ] reach of the security of a system" is defined as "the unauthorized 
acquisition of computerized data that compromises the security, 
confidentiality, or integrity of the personal information maintained by a 
business .... ,,49 The above described breach serves as the only trigger for 
the notification processes.50 As a result, only the exposure of 
computerized data can initiate a business's notification protocol. 
Such a restriction on the notification requirement undercuts the 
effectiveness of Maryland's security breach notification law. Personal 
46 COM. LAW § 14-3502(b). 
47 COM. LAW § 14-3501(e). 
48 See COM. LAW § 14-3503 (placing no limits on the applicability of this protective 
provision). 
49 COM. LAW § 14-3504(a)(I). 
50 COM. LAW §§ 14-3504(b)-(c). 
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infonnation stored in a paper record is no less vulnerable or sensitive.51 
Should Marylanders not be given the same opportunity to protect 
themselves from identity theft when their credit card infonnation is stolen 
from a business's paper records? It makes no sense to offer these records 
less protection than their computerized counterparts, especially 
considering the financial and security implications of identity theft. 
Maryland should join the minority of states that require notification 
regardless of the medium in which the personal infonnation is stored. 52 
III. PARTIES SUBJECT TO THE STATUTE 
The applicability of the MPIP A needs to expand in scope to include 
government. Currently, MPIPA is only applicable to businesses. 53 The 
Act defines a "business" as "a sole proprietorship, partnership, 
corporation, association, or any other business entity, whether or not 
organized to operate at a profit." 54 It also specifies that the tenn 
"[b ]usiness" includes "a financial institution organized, charted, licensed, 
or otherwise authorized under the laws of this State, any other state, The 
United States, or any other country, and the parent or subsidiary of a 
financial institution.,,55 Excluding government from this legislative 
scheme is unreasonable given the history of security breach notification 
laws, the government's susceptibility to breaches in infonnation security, 
the infonnation stored by the government, and the prevalence of state 
security breach notification laws that include government entities.56 Also, 
while Maryland provides some government safeguards, they do not 
provide the same level of protection that an expansion of MPIPA's 
jurisdiction would bestow. 
51 See Timothy H. Skinner, California's Database Breach Notification Security Act: The 
First State Breach Notification Law Is Not Yet a Suitable Template for National Identity Theft 
Legislation, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH I, '\140-41 (Fall 2003) (discussing privacy advocates' 
concerns with California's security breach notification legislation and its failure to provide 
protection to paper records). 
52 See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.48.0 I O(a) (West 2010); see also HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 487N-2 (West 2010); IND. CODE. ANN. § 24-4.9-2-2 (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
93H, § 3 (West 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-65 (West 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.98 
(West 20 I 0). 
53 See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3502 (West 2011) (requiring that businesses take 
precautions when destroying customer records that contain personal information); see also 
COM. LAW § 14-3503 (mandating that businesses implement reasonable security procedures 
and practices to protect the personal information of Marylanders); COM. LAW § 14-3504 
(requiring businesses to notifY individuals when there has been a security breach that 
jeopardizes their personal information). 
54 COM. LAW § 14-3501 (b)(1). 
55 COM. LAW § 14-3501 (b)(2). 
56 St. Amant, supra note 29, at 519-20; see infra note 73. 
2012] Strengthening Maryland's Security Breach Notification Law 139 
California promulgated the first state security breach notification law 
in 2003 in response to a breach at the Stephen P. Teale Data Center, a 
state operated data storage facility. 57 The data center housed the sensitive 
personal information of state employees, including first and middle 
initials, last names, and social security numbers. 58 The breach, which 
occurred on April 2, 2002, potentially exposed the personal information 
of 265,000 employees.59 The subsequent investigation revealed 
concerning gaps in the state's information security at this center. 60 As a 
direct result, California passed the Database Breach Notification Security 
Act and, not surprisingly, the Act applies to government.61 
Considering the susceptibility of government agencies to security 
breaches, as evident in the California breach, it is incongruous that 
Maryland does not apply MPIP A to the government. One privacy rights 
organization reports that over 130,000,000 government and military 
records containing personal information have been breached since 2005.62 
According to the Identity Theft Resource Center's data for 2010, 
breaches of government records accounted for over 15% of all reported 
breaches63 and also have been among some of the largest. 64 An example 
of such vulnerability occurred in 2006 when the Department of Veteran 
Affairs revealed a breach that compromised the data of approximately 
26.5 million active duty personnel and veterans.65 Another alarming 
example occurred when the National Archives and Records 
Administration experienced a breach in 2009 that may have exposed the 
personal information of 70 million veterans.66 The breach occurred when 
the agency sent a defective hard drive back to its vendor for repair and 
57 See Skinner, supra note 51, at ~~15-20 (discussing the events that led to the passage of 




61 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.29 (West 2011). 
62 Chronology oj Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARING HOUSE, 
https:llwww.privacyrights.orgldata-breachlnew (last visited Apr. 8, 2012). The Privacy 
Rights Clearing House compiles reported information security breaches and stores the 
information in a searchable online database. Id. When this database was queried for 
Government and Military data breaches on February 29, 2012 it revealed that 132,911,637 
records had been compromised from 537 separate breaches. Id. 
63 2010 Data Breach Stats, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, 11-14 (Dec. 29, 2010), 
available at http://www.idtheftcenter.orgiartman2/uploads/I/ITRC_Breach_Stats_Report_ 
20101229.pdf. 
64 Id. 
65 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, A Statement from the Dep't of Veterans 
Affairs (May 22, 2006), available at http://wwwl.va.gov/opa/pressreUpressrelease.cfm? 
id=1123. 
66 Ryan Single, Probe Targets Archives' Handling oj Data on 70 Million Vets, WIRED 
(Oct. I, 2009), http://www.wired.comlthreatlevel/2009/1 O/probe-targets-archives-handling -of-
data-on-70-million-vets/. 
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recycling without first destroying the data.67 Maryland Government is 
not immune to such security lapses. In 2010, the Maryland Department 
of Human Resources experienced a breach that exposed approximately 
3,000 records. 68 In this case, an employee of the department posted the 
names and social security numbers of 3,000 individuals on his personal 
website.69 
It is further unreasonable to exclude government from the effects of 
this legislation because it stores the same type of personal information as 
businesses. Consider the information provided to the Maryland 
Comptroller on Form 502, the Maryland Resident Income Tax Return.7o 
The form requires first name, last name, and social security number. 71 
Bank routing and account numbers are often provided to facilitate 
payment of refunds. 72 Also, with online payment of fees, government 
agencies are collecting sensitive personal and financial information over 
the web on a daily basis. 73 So if government is collecting the same type 
of personal information as the private sector and in the same manner, why 
is government not held to the same standard under the MPIP A ? 
Furthermore, the majority of states that have security breach 
notification laws require government entities to comply with, at 
minimum, the notification provisions of their legislation. 74 However, 
some of these states have exempted government agencies from the 
enforcement measures of their security breach notification legislation. 75 
67 Id. 
68 Erin Cunningham, State Employee Posts Social Security Numbers on Website, 
GAZETTE (July 23, 20 I 0), http://ww2.gazette.netistories/072320 I 0/polinew203 725 _3253 7. 
php. 
69 Jd. 




73 See, e.g., Maryland Department of Transportation, Fast Track, MOTOR VEHICLES 
ADMINISTRATION, available at https://securetransactions.mva.maryland.gov/emvastore/ 
MustHave2.aspx?SingleUse WindowGuid=899065f9-ce81-41 f3-a638-169fdfdd4da9 (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2012) (outlining how the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration's online 
registration renewal process gathers a combination of the following data: credit card 
information, bank routing and account numbers, Maryland driver's license number, and date 
of birth). 
74 See Data Quality Campaign, State Security Breach Response Laws: State-by-State 
Summary Table, DATA QUALITY CAMPAIGN, available at http://www.dataqualitycampaign.org/ 
files/State%20Security%20Breach%20Chart%20Final%20for''1020posting%2020 II %2003%2 
OlD.pdf (last updated Feb. 2011) (providing a 50 state survey of SBNLs, which includes the 
identification of states that apply their SBNL to government). 
75 Florida, Hawaii, Maine, and Tennessee specifically exclude government entities from 
enforcement proceedings. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.568I(l)(d) (West 2011) ("administrative 
sanctions outlined in this section shall not apply in the case of personal information in the 
custody of any governmental agency or subdivision"); HAw. REv. STAT. § 487N-3(a), (b) 
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Essentially, these governments are required to notify individuals of 
breaches, but non-compliance is not punished under their respective 
acts. 76 In addition, the federal government, through the Office of 
Management and Budget ("OMB"), requires federal agencies to develop 
and implement breach notification policies.77 In light of this and the 
information outlined above, Maryland needs to join this majority and 
apply the standards of the MPIP A to government. 
Even though government is not currently subject to MPIPA, there are 
personal information protections in place at Maryland state agencies. The 
Maryland Department of Information Technologies ("DolT") has 
developed an information security policy to be followed by all "Executive 
Departments and Independent State agencies . . . in order to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of state owned information.,,78 
The security policy sets requirements regarding asset management, 
physical security, network security, and access contro1.79 The security 
requirements serve the same function as MPIP A's mandate that 
businesses that own or license personal information of Maryland 
residents "implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and 
practices.,,8o While these measures are important in preventing security 
breaches, there is nothing in DolT's Information Security Policy that 
requires agencies to provide notice to individuals whose information has 
been compromised. In addition, this policy does not create an option of 
recourse for affected individuals. The enforcement provision of this 
policy focuses on "[d]isciplinary action, up through termination .... ,,81 
Given that these security procedures lack a notification requirement and 
(West 2011) (exempting government form the Act's civil fines and private actions for 
damages); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 10, § 1349(\)(A) (West 2011) (indicating that civil fines 
do not apply to the government); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107(h) (West 20 II) (exempting 
government from the private right of action provision of the enforcement measures). 
76 Florida, Hawaii, Maine, and Tennessee specifically exclude government entities from 
enforcement proceedings. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681(1)(d) (West 2011) ("administrative 
sanctions outlined in this section shall not apply in the case of personal information in the 
custody of any governmental agency or subdivision"); see also HAW. REv. STAT. § 487N-3(a), 
(b) (West 2011) (exempting government from the Act's civil fines and private actions for 
damages); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1349(\)(A) (West 2011) (indicating that civil fines 
do not apply to the government); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107(h) (West 2011) (exempting 
government from the private right of action provision of the enforcement measures). 
77 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Memorandum 
for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Safeguarding Against and Responding to 
the Breach of Personally Identifiable Information, I (May 22, 2007), available at 
http://www . whitehouse.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/omb/memorandalfy2007 Im07 -16. pdf. 
78 MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, Information Security Policy 
Version 2.3, 4 (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.djs.state.md.us/policies/ 
DoITSecurityPolicy.pdf. 
79 Id. at 5-6, 19-29. 
80 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3503(a) (West 2011). 
81 Maryland Department ofInforrnation Technology, supra note 78, at 30. 
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individual recourse, it is critical that Maryland amend MPIP A to include 
government. 82 
IV. NOTIFICATION 
Another important element of security breach notification legislation 
is the notification process, which can be broken down into basic 
components: notification triggers, timing of notice, method of notice, 
contents of the notice, and receiving parties.83 While most of MPIPA's 
notification process is effective, there are two areas where changes are 
necessary. First, the notification trigger is vague and needs to be clarified 
in order to avoid over-notification of individuals. Second, the deadline 
for notifying individuals about a security breach needs to be clearly 
defined to ensure an expedient response and to lower security breach 
response costs for "anxious" businesses. 
A. Acquisition vs. Harm Notification Triggers 
The initial trigger for notification under a security breach notification 
law ("SBNL") is the occurrence of a security breach that compromises an 
individual's personal information.84 However, once a security breach has 
occurred, states diverge on when to require notification. Some states, like 
California, have a broad notification trigger that requires individual 
notification whenever an unauthorized acquisition of personal 
information has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur.85 Critics of this 
trigger argue that the acquisition approach is too broad and will 
desensitize the public to the severity of security breaches.86 In addition, it 
82 The Maryland Department of Infonnation Technology has released its new 
Infonnation Security Policy that goes into effect in April 2012. These updated policies do not 
address notification. See generally Maryland Department of Infonnation Technology, 
Information Security Policy Version 3.0 (Oct. 2011), available at http://pilot.doit.maryland. 
gov/supportlDocuments/security _guidelineslDoITSecurityPolicyv3. pdf (outlining the policies 
ofthe Maryland Department ofInfonnation Technology). 
83 See COM. LAW §§ 14-3504(b)-(j). 
84 See COM. LAW §14-3504(b) (requiring individual notification after the breach of the 
security of a system). 
85 See, e.g., CAL. Cry. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2011) (requiring regulated entities to 
"disclose any breach of the security of the system following discovery or notification of the 
breach in the security of the data to any resident of California whose unencrypted personal 
infonnation was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized 
person"). 
86 See Skinner, supra note 51, at ~~33-34 (discussing the Investment Company Institute's 
opposition to California's security breach notification law and its acquisition trigger for 
notification); see also Jill Joerling, Note, Data Breach Notification Laws: An Argumentfor a 
Comprehensive Federal Law to Protect Consumer Data, 32 WASH. UJ.L. & POL'y 467,487 
(2010) (arguing for the creation of a federal security breach notification law that requires a 
reasonable chance of hann to trigger notification, in order to help "prevent consumers from 
receiving an influx of useless notifications"). 
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places the higher burden on businesses by requiring expensive 
notification even when there is no reasonable indication of harm.87 
Finally, it has been argued that, due to the technical limitations of 
intrusion detection software, acquisition triggers may be broader than 
intended.88 
Other states have attempted to narrow the triggering event by 
requiring an element of harm.89 By adding this requirement, these 
statutes limit notification to cases in which the business experiencing the 
breach determines that some level of injury is likely to occur to the 
individual whose information has been exposed.9o However, the level of 
harm required in these statutes varies. Some states, such as Colorado, 
allow a business to forego notification if after investigating the breach it 
detennines that "misuse" of the personal information has not occurred or 
will not likely occur.91 Other states do not require notification if there is 
no reasonable likelihood of "harm.,,92 With such vague standards, there is 
no guidance as to what constitutes "misuse" or "harm." Conversely, 
some states define the type of harm required to trigger notification, 
whether it be a financial harm as required by Arizona,93 or a specific 
crime like Virginia, which requires notification only when a breach 
"causes, or the individual or entity reasonably believes has caused, or will 
cause, identity theft or other fraud to any resident of the 
Commonwealth.,,94 Opponents of the harm trigger argue that it offers the 
individual inadequate protection from identity theft by failing to provide 
individuals the opportunity to protect themselves.95 In particular, the fact 
that the compromised business is left to evaluate whether a likelihood of 
harm is reasonable upsets critics of this system.96 
87 Skinner, supra note 51, at ~~33-34. 
88 See Skinner, supra note 51, at ~3 8 (discussing the limitations of intrusion detection 
software and the practical effects on California's acquisition trigger for notification of security 
breaches). 
89 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-11O-105(d) (West 2011) ("[n]otification under this 
section is not required if, after a reasonable investigation, the person or business determines 
that there is no reasonable likelihood ofhann to customers."). 
90 ld. 
91 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716(2)(a) (West 2011). 
92 See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:3074(0) (2011) ("[n]otification under this title is 
not required if after a reasonable investigation the person or business detennines that there is 
no reasonable likelihood ofhann to customers."). 
93 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-7501(L)(l) (2011) (defining a security breach as an 
unauthorized acquisition of personal infonnation that "causes or is reasonably likely to cause 
substantial economic loss to an individual"). 
94 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6(A)(West2011). 
95 See Tom, supra note 27, at 1595-97 (discussing the drawbacks of allowing regulated 
entities to conduct their own investigations to determine whether a significant risk of hann 
exists as the result of security breaches). 
96 ld. 
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The MPIP A utilizes a "misuse" trigger to initiate individual 
notification. MPIP A defines a breach of the security system as "the 
unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that compromises the 
security, confidentiality, or integrity of the personal information 
maintained by a business .... ',97 Once a breach has occurred it can 
trigger two notification duties. 98 The first duty is placed on businesses 
that own or license personal information.99 After a security breach is 
discovered, these businesses are required to "conduct in good faith a 
reasonable and prompt investigation to determine the likelihood that 
personal information of the individual has been or will be misused as 
result of the breach."loo If, after conducting this investigation, the 
business determines that "misuse of individual personal information has 
occurred or is reasonably likely to occur," they must notify the affected 
individua1. 101 The second duty is placed on businesses that maintain 
computerized personal information that they do not own or license. 102 
These businesses are required to notify the business for which they are 
maintaining the personal information when the breach "has resulted or 
will result in the misuse of personal information of an individual residing 
in the State.,,103 The second duty would then trigger the business' duty to 
inform owners or licensees of the security breach. 104 
The current misuse notification trigger in Maryland's statute is too 
vague to provide businesses with appropriate guidance and will result in 
unnecessary notifications and expenses. In its current form, the statute 
leaves open questions regarding what level of harm the term "misuse" is 
intended to protect against. What level of harm is the term "misuse" 
intended to avoid? Misuse could be interpreted to encompass a broad 
range of consequences beyond identity theft or financial harm, and could 
include, for example, reputational harm. The vague nature of this term is 
only compounded by the requirement that notification be provided when 
misuse is "reasonably likely to occur.,,105 This combination of language 
creates a trigger that is as broad as an acquisition-based trigger. Such a 
reading may result in individuals receiving notifications when there is no 
concrete risk of harm. It also may force businesses to unnecessarily 
allocate resources to the notification processes when these resources 
97 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3504(a)(I)(West 2011). 
98 COM. LAW § 14-3504(b)-(c). 
99 COM. LAW § 14-3504(b). 
100 COM. LAW § 14-3504(b)(l). 
101 COM. LAW § 14-3504(b)(2). 
102 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3504(c)(l) (West 2011). 
103 COM. LAW § 14-3504(c)(l). 
104 COM. LAW § 14-3504(c)(I). 
105 COM. LAW § 14-3504(b)(2). 
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could be better spent on improvements to the businesses' infonnation 
security programs. 
To reduce the risk of over-notification and inefficient allocation of 
business resources, Maryland needs to adopt a concrete definition of the 
hann it is trying to avoid. This can be accomplished by linking the 
notification duty to the threat of Identity Fraud, as defined in section 8-
301 of the Criminal Law Article of the Maryland Code. I06 The crime 
covers a range of threats. However, the relevant prohibitions are (1) 
obtaining personal identifying infonnation without consent "in order to 
use, sell, or transfer the infonnation to get a benefit, credit, good, service, 
or other thing of value in the name of the individual,,,lo7 and (2) assuming 
the identity of another "to avoid identification, apprehension, or 
prosecution for a crime; or with fraudulent intent to: (i) get a benefit, 
credit, good, service, or other thing of value; or (ii) avoid the payment of 
debt or other legal obligation."lo8 This approach, which has been adopted 
by numerous states,109 provides regulated entities with a clearer definition 
of the threats to be evaluated in their security breach investigation. It also 
aligns the Act with homeland security and financial threats posed by 
these data breaches. 
In addition, MPIP A should be amended to help ensure that businesses 
conduct adequate investigations into the risks generated by an 
infonnation security breach. MPIP A already has one safeguard in place: 
It mandates that if a business detennines that notification "is not required, 
the business shall maintain records that reflect its detennination for 3 
years after the detennination is made."IIO By requiring this 
documentation, the Act establishes an incentive to conduct a serious 
investigation of the security breach. Such documentation can be used to 
evaluate the investigation in cases where the security breach results in 
hann to individuals, yet the business forwent notification based on their 
risk assessment. This incentive could be strengthened by requiring the 
business to provide this documentation to the Consumer Protection 
Division of the Office of the Attorney General, the office responsible for 
106 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-301 (West 2011); see generally COM. LAW § 14-
3504(b)(2), (c)(I). 
107 CRIM. LAW § 8-301(b). 
108 CRIM. LAW § 8-301(c). 
109 See State Security Breach Response Laws: State-by-State Summary Table, DATA 
QUALITY CAMPAIGN, http://www.dataqualitycampaign.org/files/State%20Security% 
20Breach%20Chart%20Final%20for''1020posting%2020 II %2003%20 10.pdf (last updated 
Feb. 2011) (providing a survey of state security breach notification laws and indicating that 
eleven states link their notification trigger to identity theft or fraud). 
110 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3504(b)(4)(West Supp. 2011). 
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the enforcement of MPIP A. III In addition to strengthening the incentive 
to conduct reasonable investigations, the above-described process would 
also provide the State with greater situational awareness and better define 
the scope of information security breaches in Maryland. Currently, the 
State is only provided notice when businesses determine there is 
sufficient risk of misuse to trigger individual notification. I 12 
B. Timing o/Notification 
With security breach notification laws ("SBNL"), once the duty to 
report a security breach is triggered, regulated entities must provide 
notification within a certain time period. I \3 The majority of states require 
that notification be made in "the most expedient time possible" and 
"without unreasonable delay.,,114 However, three states have set specific 
boundaries for notification. Florida, Ohio, and Wisconsin require 
notifications be made without unreasonable delay, but no later than 45 
days after learning of the breach. I 15 
The MPIP A requires businesses that own or license computerized 
personal information to provide notification of security breaches to 
individuals "as soon as reasonably practicable" after the business 
conducts the required investigation into the security breach. 116 A similar 
time line is placed on businesses that maintain personal information for 
other businesses.1I7 These businesses must provide the owners of this 
data notice of a security breach as soon as reasonably practicable. I IS This 
notification then triggers the owner's duty to investigate and notify 
individuals of the security breach. 119 
This provision should be amended to create a definitive deadline for 
security breach notification, creating a bright line rule, like the ones 
adopted by Florida, Ohio, and Wisconsin, and providing several benefits 
to Marylanders and regulated businesses. First, it could help reduce the 
compliance costs for businesses subject to the legislation. A recent study 
111 See COM. LAW § 14-3508 (making a violation ofMPIPA "an unfair or deceptive trade 
practice within the meaning of Title 13 of this article"); see also COM. LAW § 13-201 
(designating the Division of Consumer Protection in the Office of the Attorney General to 
administer Title 13, the Consumer Protection Act). 
112 See COM. LAW § 14-3504(h) ("[p]rior to giving the notification required under 
subsection (b) of this section and subject to subsection (d) of this section, a business shall 
provide notice ofa breach of the security of a system to the Office of the Attorney General."). 
113 See Joerling, supra note 86, at 477. 
114 /d.; accord Data Quality Campaign, supra note 109, at 1. 
115 FLA. STAT. ANN. §817.5681(l)(a) (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
1349. 19(B)(2)(West Supp. 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. §134.98(3)(a) (West 2011). 
116 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3504(b)(1)-(3)(West Supp. 2011). 
117 COM. LAW § 14-3504(c)(1)-(2). 
118 COM. LAW § 14-3504(c)(2). 
119 COM. LAW § 14-3504(b)(l)-(2). 
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by the Ponemon Institute revealed that companies that respond fastest to 
SBNLs incur the largest response expense. 120 In 2010, a study indicated 
that companies who notified victims within one month of discovering a 
data breach averaged a cost of $268 per record. 121 Their slower 
counterparts only paid an average response cost of $174 per record. 122 
The study suggested "moving too quickly through the data breach process 
may cause cost inefficiencies for the organization, especially during the 
detection, escalation and notification phases.,,123 The Ponemon Institute 
speculated that such an increase reflects the "pressure companies feel to 
comply with commercial regulations and state and federal data protection 
laws.,,124 Maryland can relieve some of the compliance anxiety 
experienced by these companies by clearly defining the time parameters 
for notification. This would allow them to more efficiently manage their 
response costs. 
Second, a specific deadline for notification better protects Marylanders 
J,Jy placing an upper limit on what is an acceptable notification time. 
Opponents of this approach argue that setting a precise deadline for 
notification allows businesses to unnecessarily delay notification in order 
to "cover up the breach or investigate how best to notify customers.,,125 
This argument is flawed. First, it assumes a race to the bottom and an 
inefficient notification deadline. The Ponemon Institute study indicated 
that 43% of surveyed businesses responded within a month. 126 This 
means 57% of the surveyed businesses took longer than 30 days. 127 If set 
properly, a bright line notification cutoff could improve the response 
times of companies that are not as anxious to comply with the current 
standard because of the inherent ambiguity of the existing language. 
Such a standard would still retain a degree of flexibility because of the 
delay provisions within MPIP A. The act further allows for a delay in 
notification if a "law enforcement agency determines that the notification 
would impede a criminal investigation or jeopardize homeland or national 
security," or if the business needs time to "determine the scope of the 
120 PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2010 Annual Study: u.s. Cost of a Data Breach, SYMANTEC, 30 
(Mar. 2011), available at http://www.symantec.comlcontentienJus/aboutimediaJpdfs/ 





125 See Tom, supra note 27, at 1600 (arguing that any federal security breach notification 
legislation should adopt a "most expedient time possible and without reasonable delay" 
standard for notification). 
126 PONEMON INSTITUTE, supra note 16, at 13. 
127 See id. 
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breach of security of a system, identify the individual affected, or restore 
the integrity of the system.,,128 
V. PREEMPTIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURES 
As a result of inherent structural flaws in security breach notification 
laws, preemptive security measures are necessary to reduce the need for 
breach notification. While Maryland's legislation emphasizes 
information security, MPIP A can be strengthened in three specific areas. 
First, to ensure better information security standards, the "reasonable 
security procedures and practice" requirements must be clarified. 129 
Second, the reasonable security procedures and practice requirements 
need to be applied directly to businesses that maintain personal 
information on behalf of other businesses. Third, MPIPA's encryption 
exemption needs to be eliminated to ensure that it does not undercut other 
security initiatives. By instituting these adjustments, Maryland will help 
reduce the need for security breach notifications by creating a better 
information security standard. 
A. The Inherent Flaw of Security Breach Notification Laws 
There is an intrinsic structural defect in all state security breach 
notification laws ("SBNL") that can discourage organizations from 
providing notice. Security breach notification laws delegate enforcement 
to the regulated entities: businesses that own, license, or maintain 
personal information. 130 The basic enforcement dilemma arises from the 
fact that SBNLs apply to a broad spectrum of enterprises, covering all 
sectors of the economy. 131 This expansive reach is not accompanied by a 
designated regulatory entity to herd this diverse flock. 132 There are no 
governmental or third party audits ensuring that businesses report their 
security breaches. As a result, SBNLs rely on the better nature of the 
regulated entities and their fear that a breach will be reported by an 
outside source. 133 The lack of resources for enforcement needs to be 
examined in conjunction with compliance costs. A business that reports a 
security breach can expose itself to lawsuits, civil fines, criminal charges, 
and reputation damage. Also, the investigation of a security breach and 
128 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3504(d)(I) (West Supp. 2011). 
129 COM. LAW § 14-3503. 
130 COM. LAW § 14-3503(a). 
131 See Jane K. Winn, Are "Better" Security Breach Notification Laws Possible?, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1133, 1156 (March 6, 2009) (discussing the inherent enforcement 
dilemma created by the broad reach of SBNLs and the reSUlting lack of clear regulatory 
oversight). 
132 See Winn, supra note 131,at 1156-57. 
133 ld. at 1155-56. 
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the provision of required notification can be expensive. As noted earlier, 
in 2010 the average response cost for a large information security breach 
was $7.2 million. 134 The combination of weak enforcement and 
potentially high compliance costs can create a situation that favors 
violation of a notification provision. 135 
The above described enforcement quagmire is compounded by the fact 
that SBNLs place a greater burden on businesses with sophisticated 
information security policies and practices.136 These organizations are 
better positioned to detect a security breach and therefore trigger the 
notification requirement. Ironically, the SBNLs "punish" businesses that 
devote a higher level of resources to avoiding security breaches. 
However, smaller, less sophisticated entities that lack the resources to 
detect breaches and businesses with negligent security practices will 
escape the notification requirement. 137 This dynamic can disincentivize 
responsible information security practices. 138 As a result of these inherent 
structural flaws, it is imperative that security standards are clearly defined 
to help ensure a baseline of detection capabilities and to minimize the 
inherent notification disincentives by reducing the occurrence of security 
breaches. 
B. The Current Protections ofMPIPA 
Fortunately, Maryland requires regulated entities to take protective 
measures to help avoid information security breaches and alleviate the 
need for notification. 139 MPIP A focuses on security breach prevention in 
three ways. First, MPIP A requires businesses to "take reasonable steps to 
protect against unauthorized access to or use of the personal information" 
when destroying a customer's records. 140 Second, businesses that own or 
license the personal information of Maryland residents are required to 
"implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices" 
in order to prevent the "unauthorized access, use, modification or 
disclosure" of this information. 141 Third, to encourage encryption, 
MPIP A provides a safe harbor for data that has been encrypted, redacted, 
or otherwise made unreadable or unusable. 142 Any information that is 
134 PONEMON INSTITUTE, supra note 16, at 13. 
135 See Winn, supra note 131, at 1143-45 (discussing how the inherent structure of 
security breach notification laws can provide a disincentive to report security breaches). 
136 See id. at 1149. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 1148-49 (explaining how SBNLs struggle to account for smaller, less 
sophisticated businesses that lack the ability to detect security breaches). 
139 See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3503 (West Supp. 2011). 
140 COM. LAW § 14-3502(b). 
141 COM. LAW § 14-3503(a). 
142 See COM. LAW § 14-3501(d)(l). 
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specifically protected in this manner is exempt from the statute's 
definition of personal information. 143 This, in turn, exempts it from the 
disposal, notification, and the reasonable information security procedure 
requirements of the statute. l44 While these provisions provide basic 
protection against information security breaches, they can be improved 
upon. 
C. Clarification of Reasonable Security Procedures and Practices 
To ensure adequate protection of personal information, MPIPA needs 
to provide additional guidance regarding reasonable security procedures 
and practices. Currently, businesses that own or license the personal 
information of Maryland residents are required to "implement and 
maintain reasonable security procedures and practices" in order to 
prevent the "unauthorized access, use, modification or disclosure of this 
information.,,145 This requirement is open to a range of interpretations 
and is reliant on litigation to define what is reasonable-a reactive rather 
than a proactive approach to information security. To address this issue, 
the Consumer Protections Division of the Office of the Attorney General 
("Consumer Protection Division") should draft regulations that require a 
written information security protocol with certain procedural and 
technical elements. 
1. Rule Making Authority of Consumer Protection Division of the 
Office of the Attorney General 
The Consumer Protection Division has the authority to draft 
regulations clarifying the reasonable security procedures and practices 
requirements in MPIP A. 146 Failure to institute reasonable security 
practices and procedures to protect personal information is a violation of 
MPIP A.147 Any violation of this Act is considered an unfair or deceptive 
trade practice under Title 13 of Maryland's Commercial Code. 148 Under 
Title 13, the Consumer Protection Division has been granted authority to 
143 See COM. LAW § 14-3501(d)(l) (excluding data that has been "encrypted, redacted, or 
otherwise protected by another method that renders the information unreadable or unusable" 
from the definition of personal information). 
144 See COM. LAW § 14-3502(b) ("[w]hen a business is destroying a customer's records 
that contain personal information of the customer, the business shall take reasonable steps to 
protect against unauthorized access to or use of the personal information ... "); see also MD. 
CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3503(a) (West 2011) (requiring reasonable security procedures 
and practices to protect personal information from unauthorized access); MD. CODE ANN., 
COM. LAW § 14-3504(b) (West 2011) (requiring individual notification when misuse of 
personal information has occurred or is likely to occur as the result of a security breach). 
145 COM. LAW § 14-3503(a). 
146 See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-205(a) (West 2002). 
147 COM. LAW § 14-3503(a). 
148 COM. LAW § 14-3508. 
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"adopt reasonable rules, regulations, and standards appropriate to 
effectuate the purpose of this subtitle, including rules, regulations, or 
standards which further define specific unfair or deceptive trade 
practices.,,149 Drafting regulations that define reasonable security 
procedures and practices as requiring an information security plan with 
specific procedural and technical requirements clearly falls within this 
grant of authority. 
2. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Model 
To clarify the information security standards required by MPIPA, 
Maryland should first look to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLB Act"), 
which requires financial institutions to protect the security and 
confidentiality of their customers' nonpublic personal information. ISO 
Congress required that the exact contours of this obligation be defined 
through administrative regulation. 151 Pursuant to this act, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) drafted regulations that require financial 
institutions to 
develop, implement and maintain a comprehensive information 
security program that is written in one or more readily accessible 
parts and contains administrative, technical, and physical 
safeguards that are appropriate to your size and complexity, the 
nature and scope of your activities, and the sensitivity of any 
customer information at issue. 152 
To guide financial institutions in the creation of their information security 
programs, the FTC enumerated five basic structural and procedural 
elements. 153 The first of these elements requires regulated entities to 
coordinate an information security program. 154 While a simple 
requirement, the regulation helps create accountability within an 
organization. 
The second element mandates that financial institutions conduct a risk 
assessment to "[i]dentify reasonably foreseeable internal and external 
risk[ s] to the security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer 
149 COM. LAW § 13-205(a)(l). 
150 15 U.S.C.A. § 6801(a) (West 2012) (stating that "[i]t is the policy of the Congress that 
each financial institution has an affinnative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of 
its customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those customers' nonpublic 
personal infonnation"). 
151 See id. §6801(b) ("In furtherance of the policy in subsection (a) of this section, each 
agency or authority described in section 6805(a) of this title shall establish appropriate 
standards for the financial institutions subject to their jurisdiction relating to administrative, 
technical, and physical safeguards .... "). 
152 FTC Standards for Safeguarding Customer Info., 16 C.F.R. § 314.3(a) (2011). 
153 FTC Standards for Safeguarding Customer Info., 16 C.F.R. § 314.4 (20ll). 
154 16 C.F.R. § 314.4(a). 
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information. . .,,155 At a minimum, the regulations proceed to specify 
three areas that should be evaluated in the risk assessment. 156 The 
relevant areas include "(1) [e]mployee training and management; (2) 
[i]nformation systems, including network and software design, as well as 
information processing, storage, transmission, and disposal; and (3) 
[d]etecting, preventing and responding to attacks, intrusions, or other 
systems failures.,,157 The planning element is critical because it provides 
basic guidance on where institutions should evaluate risk while allowing 
the flexibility to contour their plans to the specific challenges discovered 
in this assessment. 
Third, once a risk assessment is completed, financial institutions are 
required to design safeguards to control the identified risks and to 
regularly monitor the effectiveness of these controls. 158 Such guidance is 
important because it emphasizes that the information security program is 
a dynamic plan that must be continually tested to ensure its effectiveness. 
The fourth element mandates that financial institutions contractually 
ensure that their service providers are capable of providing appropriate 
safeguards for their customers' personal information. 159 Maryland has 
already incorporated this element into MPIP A by dictating that 
businesses must contract for reasonable security procedures and practices 
when they provide personal information to a nonaffiliated third party. 160 
The fifth procedural element of these regulations requires evaluation 
and adjustment of the information security plan in three scenarios. 161 The 
plan should be adjusted based on: (1) the findings of the regular 
monitoring and testing of information safeguards; (2) whenever there are 
material changes to the institution's operations or business; or (3) 
whenever "any other circumstances that you know or have reason to 
know may have a material impact on your information security 
program.,,162 These procedures emphasize that information security is not 
stagnant, and therefore, an information security plan should be an organic 
document that adapts and grows as its environment changes. 
The federal regulations outlined above provide excellent guidance for 
the development of an information security program. These regulations 
dictate key structural and procedural elements while allowing businesses 
the flexibility to craft these plans to their specific circumstances. By 
adopting similar regulations, the Consumer Protections Division can 
155 16 C.F.R. § 314.4(b). 
156 ld. 
157 /d. 
158 16 C.F.R. § 314.4(c). 
159 16 C.F.R. § 314.4(d). 
160 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3503(b) (West Supp. 2011). 
161 16 C.F.R. § 314.4(e). 
162 ld. 
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provide a road map to establishing reasonable security procedures and 
practices that will benefit less sophisticated enterprises and ensure an 
improved level of information security. 
3. Technical Guidance 
In addition to providing procedural guidance, the Consumer Protection 
Division should provide technical guidance to proactively ensure that 
basic and effective precautions are instituted. Massachusetts provides an 
interesting model for this proposition. Pursuant to its security breach 
notification law, Massachusetts adopted regulations that provide for a 
written security program requirement similar to the one developed by the 
FTC under the GLB ACt. 163 However, it created additional technical 
requirements for the computer systems of regulated entities. 164 The 
regulation states "that, at a minimum, and to the extent technically 
feasible," information security programs must contain the following 
elements: 
(1) secure user authentication protocols, (2) secure access control 
measures, (3) encryption of all transmitted records and files 
containing personal information that will travel across public 
networks, and encryption of all data containing personal 
information to be transmitted wirelessly, (4) [r ] easonab Ie 
monitoring of systems, for unauthorized use or access to personal 
information, (5) [e ]ncryption of all personal information stored on 
laptops or other portable devices, (6) firewall protections, (7) 
[r]easonably up-to-date versions of system security agent 
software, and (8) specific education and training of employees on 
the proper use of computer security system and the importance of 
personal information security. 165 
Massachusetts provides additional guidance regarding several of the 
technical elements listed above. For example, when describing the level 
of required access control, the regulations state that these measures 
should: 
163 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H, § 2(a) (West 2011) (instructing the Department 
of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation to adopt regulations to safeguard the personal 
information of residents of Massachusetts); compare 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03 (20ll) 
(outlining the procedural requirements of Massachusetts's comprehensive information 
security program requirement), with 16 C.F.R. § 314.4 (providing the procedural requirements 
for the information security program for financial institutions subject to G-L-B Act). 
164 See 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.04 (2011) (designating specific computer system 
requirements for entities subject to the Commonwealth's SBNL). 
165 Id. 
154 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 42.2 
(a) restrict access to records and files containing personal 
information to those who need such information to perform their 
job duties; and (b) assign unique identifications plus passwords, 
which are not vendor supplied default passwords, to each person 
with computer access, that are reasonably designed to maintain 
the integrity of the security ofthe access controls. 166 
While some of the requirements resound of common sense, they provide 
technical guideposts to ensure that less secure entities are put on notice 
regarding the basic technical elements of a "reasonable" information 
security program. 
Although Massachusetts provides an admirable framework for 
Maryland to consider, there is one specific area that should be further 
delineated. Maryland should create a specific benchmark for the level of 
encryption required to ensure reasonable security. Under its information 
security regulations, Massachusetts defines encryption as "the 
transformation of data into a form in which meaning cannot be assigned 
without the use of a confidential process or key.,,167 Similarly, MPIPA 
defines encryption as "the transformation of data through the use of an 
algorithmic process into a form in which there is a low probability of 
assigning meaning without use of a confidential process or key." 168 Both 
of these definitions fail to acknowledge that there are different levels of 
data encryption. 169 In order to clearly identify the required level of 
encryption, Maryland should benchmark the encryption requirement to an 
established national standard. Nevada has adopted this approach by 
defining encryption under its security breach notification law as: 
the protection of data in electronic or optical form, in storage or in 
transit, using: (1) An encryption technology that has been adopted 
by an established standards setting body, including, but not 
limited to, the Federal Information Processing Standards issued 
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, which 
renders such data indecipherable in the absence of associated 
cryptographic keys necessary to enable decryption of such data ... 
170 
Benchmarking MPIPA's encryption standard to the Federal Information 
Processing Standards ("FIPS") issued by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology ("NIST") provides several benefits. First, it 
166 See id. at 17.04(2). 
167 See id. at 17.02. 
168 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-350 1 (c)(West 2011). 
169 See Skinner, supra note 51, at 45-46 (discussing the varying types of encryption while 
analyzing California's SBNL). 
170 NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 603A.215(5)(b) (West 2011). 
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provides a specific definition for the expected encryption standard. l7I 
Second, the FIPS for encryption are reviewed every five years "in order 
to consider new or revised requirements that may be needed to meet 
technological and economic changes." 172 This review process makes 
FIPS an efficient benchmark. The encryption standard will automatically 
adjust as technology progresses, without expending any of Maryland's 
resources. Third, NIST and the Canadian Government's Communication 
Security Establishment maintain the Cryptographic Module Validation 
Program ("CMVP,,).173 This program certifies whether or not 
cryptographic modules comply with the encryption standards of FIPS. 174 
The CVMP also maintains a list of vendors who provide these certified 
products. 175 This vendor list could be used to link regulated entities to 
products that meet the new standard ifMPIPA benchmarks its encryption 
standards to FIPS. 
Also, it is interesting to note that the Maryland Department of 
Information Technology has adopted an internal encryption standard 
benchmarked to FIPS and required on all portable data storage devices 
containing confidential information. 176 If Maryland deems this an 
appropriate security standard for its confidential information, it seems 
that it would be appropriate to require the same of businesses that store 
personal information. 
Given the large number of information security breaches resulting 
from lost or stolen laptops and data storage devices, encryption of such 
devices is particularly relevant to Maryland. In 2008, 45.6% of the 
information security breach notices reported to the Maryland Attorney 
General's Office related to stolen laptops and portable data storage 
devices. 177 
171 See NIST, FIPS Publication 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, 
12-40 (May 21, 2001), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/ 
fips1402.pdf (providing security standards for various aspect of cryptographic modules). 
172 Id. at vi. 
173 Cryptographic Module Validation Program, NIST: COMPUTER SECURITY DIVISION: 
COMPUTER SECURITY RESOURCE CENTER, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html 
(last updated Feb. 16,2012). . 
174 Id. 
175 Module Validation List, NIST: COMPUTER SECURITY DIVISION: COMPUTER SECURITY 
RESOURCE CENTER, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STMlcmvp/validation.html (last updated Apr. 
5,2012). 
176 Maryland Department of Information Technology, Information Security Policy 
Version 2.3, 6-7 (September 2010), available at http://doit.maryland.gov/supportlDocuments/ 
security _guidelineslDoITSecurityPolicy. pdf. 
177 The Maryland Attorney General's Office makes each information security breach 
notice it receives available on its website and has records from 2008-2010. A survey of these 
notices indicates that stolen laptops and data storage devices constituted 102 of the 228 
reported security breaches in 2008. Maryland Attorney General, Maryland Information 
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4. Certification ofInformation Security Plans 
Clearly defining the parameters of required information security 
measures is critical in protecting the personal information of Maryland 
residents. However, these measures are only effective if adopted by the 
regulated entities. In order to encourage compliance with the proposed 
information security standards, Maryland should create a third party 
certification process similar to the independent self-regulatory 
organizations in the securities market that assess whether products 
conform to technical standards. 178 Such certification could create a 
rebuttable presumption that the organization has instituted reasonable 
security procedures and practices. 179 In the alternative, Maryland could 
empower an agency to administer this certification process with 
administrative costs covered in part by an application fee. In either event, 
the certification process could incentivize regulated entities to adopt 
security measures to help decrease the risk of liability from a security 
breach. 
D. Direct Application of the Reasonable Security Procedures and 
Practices Requirement to Those Who Maintain Personal 
Information on Behalf of Other Businesses 
MPIP A needs to apply its reasonable security procedures and practices 
requirement directly to businesses that maintain this data on behalf of 
other entities to better protect the personal information of Maryland 
residents. Currently, MPIP A only requires businesses that own or license 
personal information to implement and maintain reasonable security 
procedures and practices. 180 However, when these businesses use a 
nonaffiliated third party as a service provider and disclose the personal 
information of a Maryland resident to this third party, they are required to 
contract for these same security standards. 181 This dynamic limits the 
recourse against third party "data maintainers" to contractual actions. In 
contrast, businesses that own or license this data are subject to civil fines 
and criminal sanctions because they have an affirmative duty under 
MPIPA to maintain reasonable security. 182 
Security Breach Notices - 2008, available at http://www.oag.state.md.us/idtheftJ 
breachNotices2008.htm. 
178 See Winn, supra note 131, at 1160 (proposing the creation of a national infonnation 
security standard for personal infonnation and the institution of an independent certification 
process that would create a presumption that reasonable precautions had been instituted by the 
regulated entity). 
179 Jd. 
180 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3503(a) (West 2011). 
181 COM. LAW § 14-3503(b). 
182 COM. LAW § 13-411. 
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Any violation of MPIPA is deemed "an unfair or deceptive trade 
practice within the meaning of Title 13 of this article; and subject to the 
enforcement and penalty provisions contained in Title 13 of this 
article.,,183 Connecting MPIPA to the enforcement and penalty provisions 
of Title 13 creates a private right of action for individuals damaged by an 
MPIPA violation. 184 The connection also allows for civil fines up to 
$1000 for each violation of MPIPA, and up to $5000 per violation for 
repeat offenders. 18S There are also criminal sanctions that can result in a 
"fine not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding one year or 
both .... ,,186 All of these enforcement actions are available when a 
company that owns or licenses personal information fails to reasonably 
protect the information. 187 However, third party "data maintainers" are 
not subject to these enforcement mechanisms because MPIP A places no 
affirmative duty to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices 
upon these entities. 188 "Data maintainers" that possess personal 
information should be subject to the full range of repercussions for failing 
to reasonably protect the information. Focusing enforcement on the 
parties that own or license personal data results in a missed opportunity to 
use MPIPA to increase the security of Marylanders' personal information. 
E. Eliminating the Encryption Safe Harbor Provision 
The way MPIPA's encryption exemption is structured undercuts the 
effectiveness of other protections offered by the act, and needs to be 
eliminated. Currently, the encryption exemption is incorporated into the 
act's definition of personal information. The relevant section of code 
states that 
'[p]ersonal information' means an individual's first name or first 
initial and last name in combination with anyone or more of the 
following data elements, when the name or the data elements are 
not encrypted, redacted, or otherwise protected by another method 
that renders the information unreadable or unusable. 189 
As discussed in sections II.A.I and II.D.2 of this article, the duties 
created by SBNLs only extend to personal information. 19o By exempting 
183 COM. LAW § 14-3508. 
184 COM. LAW § 13-408(a) 
185 COM. LAW § 13-4IO(a)-(b). 
186 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-41 I (a) (West Supp. 2011). 
187 COM. LAW §§ 13-410,13-411. 
188 COM. LAW § 14-3503. 
189 COM. LAW § 14-3501(d)(l). 
190 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 3504(a)(I) (West 2011) (defining the breach of 
a security system as the "unauthorized acquisition of computer data that compromises ... the 
personal information maintained by a business") (emphasis added); see also MASS. CODE 
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encrypted data from duties like the notification requirement, SBNLs 
attempt to encourage businesses to adopt encryption technology. 191 
Unfortunately, this incentive undercuts the MPIPA's efforts to require 
preemptive protections. Since encrypted personal information is removed 
from the purview of Md. Code Ann., Com. Law section 14-3503, 
businesses only need to encrypt their data and take no other security 
measure. l92 Thus, the encryption exemption becomes the definition of a 
reasonable security. 
Such a dynamic has the potential to create greater security risks 
because it equates encryption with reasonable security. Encryption 
should be an important part of a security program, but should not be the 
only part. 193 "Security is only as strong as the weakest link, and the 
mathematics of cryptography is almost never the weakest link . . . . 
[s]ecurity is a broad stockade: it's the things around the cryptography that 
make the cryptography effective.,,194 
The Maryland Department of Information Technologies' Information 
Security Policy supports this assertion. The policy establishes standards 
for not just encryption, but also asset management, physical security, 
network security, and access control. 195 
Two simple examples where encryption alone fails to create a 
reasonable security protocol are unauthorized employee access and static 
personal information. Unauthorized employee access could involve a 
former employee who had secured the encryption key while employed. 
The former employee could exploit this key to breach encrypted personal 
information if the company has weak user authentication protocols that 
do not quickly adjust the employee's access to the database. It will also 
be difficult to detect this unauthorized access if the business does not 
have a reasonable monitoring system for their database. Both of these 
security protocols-restricting access to active users and active user 
accounts and instituting reasonable monitoring systems-are required in 
REGs. § 17.04 (2011) ("[e]very person that owns or licenses personal information ... shall 
include in its written, comprehensive security program ... ") (emphasis added). 
191 See Winn, supra note 131, at 1145-46 (analyzing the encryption exemptions 
effectiveness as a "technology-forcing legislation"). 
192 COM. LAW § 14-3501(d)(J) ('''[p]ersonal information' means an individual's first 
name or first initial and last name in combination with anyone or more of the following data 
elements, when the name or the data elements are not encrypted ... ") (emphasis added). 
;93 See Skinner, supra note 51, at 'tI'tI46-49 (stating that encryption is "designed to 
supplement an overall risk-based security program. It is part of the solution, not the 
solution"). 
194 See Winn, supra note 131, at 1146 (quoting BRUCE SCHNEIER, PRACTICAL 
CRYPTOGRAPHY, at xviii (2003)). 
195 Maryland Department of Information Technology, Information Security Policy 
Version 2.3, 1-2 (September 2010), available at http://doit.rnaryland.gov/supportJDocuments/ 
security pidelineslDoITSecurityPolicy.pdf. 
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Massachusetts' computer system security requirements, 196 provisions that 
Maryland should adopt. Furthennore, current employees can present the 
same threat to encrypted personal infonnation. This threat can be 
mitigated by having secure access control procedures that (1) restrict 
access to records containing personal information to only those who 
require this infonnation for their job function, and (2) assign unique 
identifications and passwords to these employees. Again, these 
procedures are part of Massachusetts' computer system security 
regulations. 197 
The second example of where encryption alone fails to provide 
reasonable infonnation security is in the protection of static personal 
information. Static personal information, such as a social security 
number, does not change over time. A thief could obtain encrypted static 
personal information and keep this data until the technology capable of 
breaking the encryption exists. 198 The infonnation, despite the delay, 
could be used to perpetrate identity theft due to its fixed nature. Again, 
adopting a broader, more robust security protocol could mitigate this 
threat. 
These examples of unauthorized employee access and static personal 
information show the danger of allowing MPIPA's encryption exemption 
to undercut the Act's reasonable security procedures and practice 
requirement. To prevent the exemption from devouring this protective 
measure, it must be removed. However, encryption benchmarked to an 
appropriate federal standard, like the Federal Information Processing 
Standard, should be required as part of the broader security procedures 
and practices proposed earlier in this artic1e. 199 In addition, MPIPA's 
notification requirement should be amended to indicate that the presence 
of the required encryption standard is a factor in the detennination of 
whether the breach of security will result in a likelihood of hann 
sufficient to trigger a notification duty.200 These adjustments will ensure 
a better security standard while preventing unnecessary notification when 
there is little risk ofhann. 
196 See 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.04 (2011) (designating specific computer system 
requirements for entities subject to the state's SBNL). 
197 Id. 
198 See Skinner, supra note 51, at ~49 (discussing the challenge of protecting static 
information with encryption). 
199 See supra IV.C.3 (discussing the need to require encryption benchmarked to a federal 
standard). 
200 See supra IILA (discussing the amendment of MPIPA so that notification is clearly 
linked to the risk ofidentity Fraud as defined by MD. CODE, CRlM. LAW § 8-301). 
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VI. ENFORCEMENT MEASURES 
Clarification is needed regarding how violations of MPIP A will be 
handled under the civil provisions of Maryland's Consumer Protection 
Act. Any violation of MPIP A is considered "(1) an unfair or deceptive 
trade practice within the meaning of Title 13 of the article; and (2) [i]s 
subject to the enforcement and penalty provisions contained in Title 13 of 
this article.,,201 The section of Title 13, the Consumer Protection Act, that 
addresses civil violations states "[a] merchant who engages in a violation 
of this title is subject to a fine of not more than $1,000 for each 
violation.,,202 However, repeat offenders can be fined up to $5,000 for 
each violation.203 These civil fines may be collected by the state in a civil 
action, an administrative cease and desist action, or an administrative 
hearing.204 
MPIPA's connection to these provisions creates an issue with how 
violations of MPIP A will be quantified. Will the failure to provide notice 
regarding a security breach be considered a single violation, or will 
failure to provide notice for each exposed record be considered a unique 
violation? This determination has a significant impact on the civil 
sanctions of the Consumer Protection Act. In a security breach that 
exposes the personal information of 100,000 individuals, the civil fine 
could top out at $1,000 or at $100 million for a first time offender.205 
Also, if this hypothetical security breach occurred because the business 
did not have reasonable security procedures and practices in place, there 
could be additional confusion. Is lacking the required security a single 
violation, or is the exposure of each record, as the result of unreasonable 
security, considered a unique violation? Again, the violator is potentially 
looking at the difference between a $1,000 and a $100 million civil 
fine. 206 
There are problems with both interpretations of the term "violation." 
First, under this enforcement scheme, if violation is defined by the breach 
rather than the number of individuals affected, it creates a very weak 
incentive for compliance. A $1,000 civil penalty for failing to notify 
100,000 individuals would easily be overshadowed by the cost of 
201 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3508 (West 2011). 
202 COM. LAW § 13-410(a). 
203 COM. LAW § 13-410(b). 
204 COM. LAW § 13-410(c). 
205 COM. LAW § 13-401(a) (reflecting that, if the merchant's security violation of exposing 
100,000 records is perceived to be one violation of the Consumer Protection Act, he or she 
could be subject to a $1,000 fine; however, if the violation is interpreted to be 100,000 
separate violations of the title, the merchant could be fined $5,000 per subsequent violation, 
which equals $100 million fine). 
206 See COM. LAW § 13-4 I O(a). 
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investigating the breach and notifying the affected individuals.207 Even 
though MPIP A provides a private right of action for individuals affected 
by violations of the act,208 it is generally very difficult to recover in 
private actions under SBNLs. 209 In these claims, the individual must 
prove that the violation of the SBNL was the source of their hann. 2\o 
However, since a violation of MPIPA is enforced under the Maryland 
Consumer Protections Act,211 the civil penalties do not require that the 
violation caused harm.2l2 This aspect can make civil penalties a more 
reliable compliance incentive, but when this penalty is set too low it loses 
its effectiveness. 
The second approach, defining a violation of MPIP A by the number of 
affected individuals, is also problematic under the current enforcement 
structure. As the earlier example illustrated, a failure to notify 100,000 
individuals could theoretically result in a $100 million fine.213 This is a 
worst-case scenario, and the Consumer Protection Division has discretion 
in setting the amount of the violation, up to $1,000 per violation for first 
time offenders.214 However, it highlights that there is no statutory cap for 
civil fines under the enforcement scheme, and there is potential for 
excessive penalties.215 
As a result of the flaws in each potential interpretation of "violation," 
the definition of violation needs to be clarified and restructured. The 
enforcement mechanism of the Consumer Protection Act is useful in that 
they endow the Consumer Protection Division with considerable 
authority and a broad array of enforcement toolS.216 However, as 
207 See PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2010 Annual Study: U.S. Cost of a Data Breach, 18 (Mar. 
2011), available at http://www.symantec.comlcontentienJus/aboutimediaJpdfs/symantec_ 
ponemon_data_breach_costsJeport.pdf (stating that the average notification cost for a large 
security breach in 2010 was $511,454). 
208 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-408(a) (West 2011) (stating that "any person may 
bring an action to recover for injury or loss sustained by him as the result of a practice 
prohibited by this title"). 
209 See Joerling, supra note 86, at 479 (discussing the limited value of a private right of 
action under SBNLs because of the difficulty in proving damages). 
210 See Hallowell v. Citaramanis, 88 Md. App. 160, 166, 594 A.2d 591, 594 (1991) 
(holding that to establish a private right of action under the Consumer Protection Act, the 
consumer must show injury or loss sustained from a practice prohibited by the Act). 
211 COM. LAW § 13-408. 
212 See COM. LAW § 13-302 ("[a]ny practice prohibited by this title is a violation of this 
title, whether or not any consumer in fact has been misled, deceived, or damaged as a result of 
that practice."); see also Hallowell v. Citaramanis, 88 Md. App. 160, 166, 594 A.2d 591, 594 
(1991) (holding that a public action does not necessarily require a consumer to prove damage). 
213 See COM. LAW § 13-41O(a). 
214 See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-4IO(a)-(b) (West 2011). 
215 See COM. LAW § 13-4IO(a). 
216 See generally COM. LAW §§ 13-401 to 13-410 (West 2011) (outlining the quasi-judicial 
powers of the Consumer Protection Division related to the enforcement of the Consumer 
Protection Act). 
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demonstrated above, the civil penalty framework is awkward when 
applied to MPIP A. In developing a clear and fluid enforcement scheme, 
there are two basic models utilized by other states that should be 
considered. The first model quantifies the violation by the security 
breach, rather than the number of individuals affected, and sets a 
considerable civil penalty. For example, Missouri's SBNL has adopted 
an enforcement system that allows the attorney general to "seek a civil 
penalty not to exceed one hundred fifty thousand dollars per breach of the 
security of the system or series of breaches of a similar nature that are 
discovered in a single investigation.,,217 
The second model defines a violation as unique to an affected 
individual, sets a significantly lower fine per violation and establishes a 
liability cap for the breach itself. Utah adopted this model and its SBNL 
states: 
[a] person who violates this chapter's provisions is subject to a 
civil fine of: (a) no greater than $2,500 for a violation or series of 
violations concerning a specific consumer; and (b) no greater than 
$100,000 in the aggregate for related violations concerning more 
than one consumer.218 
Michigan implemented a similar approach and clarified its enforcement 
measures by stating that a person who violates their SBNL "may be 
ordered to pay a civil fine of not more than $250.00 for each failure to 
provide notice.,,219 However, such liability is limited to $750,000 for any 
security breach.220 Either of these models would improve the 
enforcement mechanisms of MPIP A because they clearly define what 
constitutes a violation, provide sufficient penalties to incentivize 
compliance, and cap a regulated entity's liability while still leaving the 
Attorney General discretion to adjust the penalty for the specific 
circumstances of the security breach. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Identity theft presents real financial and homeland security threats that 
must be met with a broad spectrum of resources. Maryland has taken an 
217 Compare Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.1500(4) (West 2011); with OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 24, 
§ 165(b) (West 2011) (allowing the attorney general or the district attorney to impose a "civil 
penalty not to exceed One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars [$150,000.00] per breach of the 
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important step toward protecting its residents with the Maryland Personal 
Information Protection Act. However, there are gaps in the legislation 
which are the result of loopholes and ambiguous provisions that create 
unnecessary vulnerability. There are three major loopholes to address. 
First, MPIPA's definition of personal information must be amended to 
ensure greater inclusion of sensitive data, and to allow the statute to 
remain effective as technology and data use progresses. Second, the Act 
must provide the same protections to paper and other traditional data 
mediums as it gives to electronic data. Third, it is essential to expand 
MPIPA's jurisdiction to include government. It is foolish to exempt 
government when it collects the same sensitive data and is subject to the 
same breaches in information security. 
The ambiguity that lurks in select provisions of MPIPA must also be 
clarified. MPIP A needs a definitive notification trigger tied to the threat 
of Identity Fraud in order to prevent over-notification, to help regulated 
entities contain their response costs, and to better align the act with the 
homeland security risk presented by stolen identities. A specific 
notification deadline should also be established to ensure that individuals 
receive notice expeditiously and that businesses can more efficiently 
manage their response resources. Similarly, MPIPA's reasonable security 
procedures and practices requirement can be clarified through regulations 
that outline the procedural and technical components of an adequate 
information security program. In conjunction with providing this 
guidance, the State should incentivize the adoption of these new 
requirements by creating a certification process that will provide a 
refutable presumption of compliance with the statute's preemptive 
measures. Also, to ensure that these new information security standards 
are effective, Maryland needs to apply them to every regulated entity that 
possesses the personal information of a Maryland resident, including 
businesses that maintain this data on behalf of another entity. The 
encryption exemption in the definition of personal information must also 
be eliminated to prevent it from undermining the prophylactic measures 
of MPIP A. Finally, Maryland must clarify the civil penalties of MPIP A 
to ensure sufficient compliance incentive. By making these adjustments, 
Maryland can provide its residents with a more efficient security breach 
notification law that will better protect their personal information from 
those who would exploit it. 
